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INTRODUCTION
Worker-owned or controlled firms face a little-studied threat from anti-
trust law that typifies broader problems with antitrust law today: it favors
coordination through concentrated ownership and control while disfavoring
coordination through democratic participation, for example, by workers.1
The case of the ride-share sector illustrates this problem especially acutely.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
** Research Director, Modern Money Network.
1. The existing literatures in labor and antitrust law have not squarely addressed the issue of
worker cooperatives and antitrust law. The antitrust literature has (most relevantly to this topic)
focused on joint ventures, sports leagues, and other specialized arrangements of interest to busi-
ness actors in the wake of the doctrines set out in Copperweld and American Needle but has not
specifically discussed worker cooperatives. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752 (1984); Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). Meanwhile, the literature
on worker cooperatives has not squarely addressed antitrust issues. One forthcoming paper is an
exception; it shares many concerns in common with the larger research agenda of which this essay
is a part. See Sandeep Vaheesan & Nathan Schneider, Cooperative Enterprise as Antimonopoly
Strategy, PENN. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming) (addressing cooperative associations of various kinds
and proposing an antitrust exemption to promote them). This essay is the only work we know of
that examines the doctrinal antitrust issues implicated by worker-run entities in detail and the first
to connect these issues to our current system for provisioning finance.
44
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It suggests that incorporation by workers, producers, or service providers is
not—without structural reforms—a solution to the antitrust paradoxes cre-
ated by the gig economy. It also suggests that structural, yet contingent,
features of the financial system reinforce and magnify antitrust law’s ex-
isting criteria for allocating coordination rights.
Antitrust law, fundamentally, allocates coordination rights, an argu-
ment that will be set out elsewhere.2 It decides which forms of economic
coordination are permitted, and which forms aren’t; put another way, it de-
cides who gets to engage in economic coordination, and who doesn’t. Eco-
nomic coordination may include things like joint bargaining; production
itself (at least, any sort of production that involves the efforts of more than
one person); geographical or other market allocation decisions; resource al-
location decisions between various economic activities, like research and
development, and expansion; and last but not least, price setting. Antitrust
law generally holds that all these activities are permissible within business
firms but subjects many of them to searching scrutiny, or bars them out of
hand, when they take place beyond firm boundaries. This is antitrust law’s
firm exemption.3 Moreover, both in the legal criteria that determine the ex-
tent of firm boundaries and also in the criteria that determine when eco-
nomic coordination beyond firm boundaries is permissible, antitrust law
evinces a preference for coordination achieved through the concentration of
control and ownership, rather than through democratic cooperation. In the
so-called gig economy in particular, these criteria have led to increasingly
anomalous results, particularly as labor law has been presumptively sus-
pended, further limiting countervailing coordination rights on the part of
workers and individual service providers.
One informal response to this problem has been, in essence: Why not
just incorporate? In this essay, we aim to answer that question in the case of
the ride-share sector. The answer, in short, is that it’s not that simple. Incor-
poration alone doesn’t earn antitrust’s firm exemption. And the kind of inte-
gration required by the legal test reproduces precisely the preference for
concentrated ownership and control that is the larger problem with anti-
trust’s allocation of coordination rights, and which poses particular
problems in the gig economy. Moreover, the behavior of firms like Uber, in
particular, illustrates how these problems are exacerbated by our existing
systems for accessing finance.
2. Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forth-
coming 2020) [hereinafter Paul I].
3. Id.; see also Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Paul II].
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ANTITRUST LAW’S FIRM EXEMPTION
Antitrust law’s firm exemption does not simply track the criteria or the
boundaries supplied by corporate law.4 In other words, that a business en-
tity has been duly formed under the state law of business organizations does
not in itself imply that economic coordination that takes place within its
boundaries, which would otherwise run afoul of federal antitrust law, is
instead protected from antitrust liability. This much is well settled at the
level of Supreme Court precedent.5 It is not a particularly controversial or
recently developed principle, either; indeed, if it were not true, then virtu-
ally any arrangement at risk of liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
could use incorporation as a shield, particularly given the highly permissive
nature of modern self-incorporation statutes.
What this means is that antitrust law supplies its own criteria to decide
whether an association qualifies as a “single entity” for antitrust purposes,
thus immunizing economic coordination that takes place within it. Ulti-
mately, these criteria are circular and question begging.6 But at the interme-
diate level and at the level of practical effect, they enact a preference for
concentrated ownership and control. That preference generates the criteria
according to which antitrust law allocates coordination rights to some as-
sociations and denies them to others. It will decide whether a particular
worker or driver cooperative association passes muster under antitrust law,
or not.
THE UBER ANTITRUST PROBLEM AND THE INCORPORATION SOLUTION
Consider a hypothetical drivers’ association whose antitrust status
comes under scrutiny. The hypothetical possibility of such an association
has come up in recent public debate as a response to the point that dominant
firms like Uber and Lyft receive coordination rights under status quo anti-
trust, while drivers do not.7 To be clear, the Uber antitrust paradox is not
that Uber is a monopoly or has engaged in unfair competition, though both
of those might also be the case,8 but that its coordination of consumer prices
4. See Paul I, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 186.
6. See Paul I, supra note 2.
7. Sanjukta Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implica-
tions, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233 (2017); Paul II, supra note 3; Marshall Steinbaum,
Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and the Labor Market, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2019)
[hereinafter Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and the Labor Market]. For discussion of this
issue in the press, see, for example, Marshall Steinbaum, Uber’s Antitrust Problem, AMERICAN
PROSPECT (May 11, 2016), https://prospect.org/article/uber’s-antitrust-problem [hereinafter
Steinbaum, Uber’s Antitrust Problem]; Aaron Gordon, The Legal Argument That Could Destroy
Uber, JALOPNIK (May 20, 2019), https://jalopnik.com/the-legal-argument-that-could-destroy-uber-
1834790506.
8. See, e.g., Diva Limousine, Ltd. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-05546-EMC, 2019 WL
2548459, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss complaint arising under
California Unfair Competition Law).
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across drivers (whom it contends constitute independent businesses) has
thus far been permitted, while drivers themselves are presumptively barred
from the identical coordination as well as lesser and related forms of coor-
dination. Uber has managed to avoid directly litigating its own antitrust
problem by compelling a consumer lawsuit that raises it to be moved into
arbitration.9 Meanwhile, federal antitrust authorities have taken no action to
investigate or prosecute this practice—despite their eagerness to intervene
to prevent far lesser forms of coordination by ride-share drivers on antitrust
grounds.10
So, one possible answer to this problem is: Why can’t drivers simply
form an association of their own, using an app similar to Uber’s or Lyft’s?
Taking this response at face value, and in a manner that could be practically
implemented, we may assume that this hypothetical association would oper-
ate in much the same manner as Uber or Lyft, with the material difference
that drivers would keep a larger proportion of the fares earned. Specifically,
we may assume (1) that the driver-run app would coordinate consumer
prices of rides, in much the same way as Uber and Lyft currently do;11 (2)
that individual drivers would collect their individual fares, minus expenses
necessary to maintain the app and any other activities of the association, as
decided by drivers through the association; and (3) that drivers would con-
tinue to own their own vehicles, maintain required insurance, and bear other
individual business costs.12
AN INCORPORATED DRIVERS’ ASSOCIATION WOULD NOT
ESCAPE ANTITRUST RISK
Now, let’s put aside for a moment the fact that even normal organizing
toward bargaining agency is currently presumptively impermissible under
antitrust law, which renders the possibility of the formation of such a
worker-run corporation significantly more remote. Assuming such an or-
ganization was successfully formed, it still would not straightforwardly
qualify for antitrust immunity under existing law. In fact, at best it would be
mired in legal uncertainty and, therefore, in prohibitive expenses. The Su-
preme Court recently reviewed its history in this area, noting that it has
“repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity
violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors and
9. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2017).
10. Paul II, supra note 3; Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and the Labor Market,
supra note 7; Brief for the United States and the Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amici Curiae in Support
of Appellant and in Favor of Reversal, Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.
2018) (No. 17-35640), 2017 WL 5166667; Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (consumer lawsuit raising Section 1 claims against Uber).
11. This argument puts aside the issue of surge pricing, which does not change the basic
antitrust issues.
12. This puts aside the special case of Uber Black and other services in which drivers do not
own their vehicles.
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served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.”13 At issue
in American Needle was a corporation, National Football League Properties
(NFLP), with its own centralized management, which made marketing and
licensing decisions as to the intellectual property separately owned by NFL
teams (namely team logos to appear on clothing and merchandise). Notably,
the revenue generated by NFLP was shared equally among the teams. The
Court held that licensing decisions made by NFLP were not the unilateral
acts of a single entity for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but
rather shielded concerted action between “independent centers of decision-
making,” namely the individual NFL teams, as to their individually owned
intellectual property.
Drivers who start a corporation that operates an app, matches riders to
drivers, and sets prices for ride services provided by drivers would be ex-
posed to risk of antitrust liability under this decision framework. As the
Supreme Court said of NFLP, “it is not dispositive . . . [to] organize[ ] and
own a legally separate entity that centralizes the management” of certain
functions.14 The Court noted that giving economic coordination that runs
afoul of § 1 “a name and a label,” by incorporating, is not sufficient to
“evade § 1 scrutiny.”15 Similarly, labeling such an enterprise a workers’
cooperative and giving it a business name will not be sufficient to avoid § 1
scrutiny, particularly in an environment in which competition authorities
have precisely shown a propensity to go after the cooperation of small play-
ers regardless of trade or worker traditions.16
This is especially likely for a drivers’ association of this sort because
of the third assumption we made: that drivers would continue to separately
own their own vehicles, to maintain insurance and otherwise meet their own
business expenses, and to separately earn revenue. Centralization of deci-
sion-making and ownership was already a criterion for permissible coordi-
nation as a single entity prior to American Needle, as set out in Copperweld
and its progeny.17 But American Needle especially focused on the teams’
separate ownership of their intellectual property in order to reach the con-
clusion that NFLP did not constitute a “single entity” for antitrust purposes.
One view is that American Needle created a new “control through asset
13. Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010); see also United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 354–58 (1967); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
606–12 (1972).
14. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 197.
15. Id.
16. California Ass’n of Legal Support Prof’ls, File No. 131-0205, Docket No. C-4447,
(F.T.C. April 3, 2014); Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., File No. 131-0118, Docket No. C-4448,
(F.T.C. April 3, 2014). See also Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of
Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., In the Matter of Cal. Ass’n of Legal Support Prof’ls (Dec. 16,
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/131216musicteachersstmt.pdf. See
also Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 192 (noting that the Court will also look past “form” in the case of
“professional organizations or trade groups”).
17. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774–77 (1984).
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ownership test” that is “substantially narrower” than previously extant sin-
gle entity principles, requiring joint “ownership of the assets required to
supply [the] functions” that are jointly coordinated in order to earn single
entity status, or in other words to qualify for antitrust’s firm exemption.18
Drivers’ separate ownership of their vehicles would disqualify a drivers’
association from antitrust immunity as a single entity under this test. More-
over, there is additional risk for drivers under this framework that was not
present for NFLP, insofar as the teams equally shared revenues generated
by NFLP, while drivers would not, realistically, equally share revenues gen-
erated through a drivers’ association.
Overall, it is at minimum highly possible—if not positively likely—
that many courts will view drivers as “potential competitors” rather than as
arms of a single firm under the test for antitrust’s firm exemption set out in
American Needle. This is especially likely because the prosecuting litigant
in such a contest will have the advantage of being able to point out that
members of such an association were, until its formation, actual competi-
tors.19 Now, one might respond that the drivers could instead form a fully
integrated, worker-owned firm in which expenses and revenues are fully
centralized in the firm, vehicles are commonly owned, and profits paid out
by a commonly agreed-upon scheme (some variant on hours worked, most
likely). We may all agree for the moment that such a firm would qualify for
antitrust’s firm exemption. But in the practical situation in which drivers
currently find themselves, it is only an academic possibility. To start with,
consider the impracticality of common ownership of vehicles in today’s sit-
uation. The vehicles that Uber’s and Lyft’s operations currently draw upon
as capital are also put to personal and household use by drivers. For drivers
to somehow render this capital (or even, say, the percentage of this capital
that reflects its use for commercial purposes) commonly owned is not feasi-
ble, for reasons of differential access to finance.20 Meanwhile, Uber and
Lyft are in a much better position to raise capital in order to either straight-
forwardly centralize ownership (by buying a fleet of cars) or to engineer a
legal or business practice innovation that would centralize partial ownership
rights on paper.
UBER IS STILL AN ANTITRUST PROBLEM—AND WHAT THIS TEACHES US
ABOUT THE FIRM EXEMPTION
Moreover, for the most part, this centralization of vehicle ownership is
not what the dominant firms in the ride-share sector currently do either.
Uber and Lyft don’t facilitate common ownership of the assets (personal
18. Benjamin Klein, Single Entity Analysis of Joint Ventures After American Needle: An
Economic Perspective, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669 (2013).
19. Courts performing a single entity analysis frequently ask whether members of an associa-
tion or joint venture are actual or potential competitors.
20. See infra The Firm Exception and Access to Finance.
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vehicles, for the most part) that are put to use in providing ride services. Yet
the “function[ ] that [is] controlled by” the firms is, precisely, ride ser-
vices;21 indeed, the firms fix the prices for those services, and joint price
setting is the quintessence of anticompetitive activity.22 Uber and Lyft do
not qualify as single entities under American Needle and are not entitled to
antitrust immunity in the manner that most firms conventionally are. It is
also unlikely that they would be able to justify their price fixing and other
coordination on some other basis without, in essence, expanding the current
boundaries of the law.23 Yet the existing antitrust authorities have shown no
inclination to prosecute or even investigate these firms, instead often taking
part in lauding their “innovation.” This is not just hypocritical, however; it
also evidences the deep bias that antitrust’s firm exemption displays toward
economic coordination achieved through centralized control based on own-
ership rights.
Specifically, it seems quite plausible that the deeper reason that most
antitrust insiders have been relatively slow even to see the antitrust problem
with Uber and Lyft—and once it is pointed out, relatively eager to defend
it—is that our current antitrust paradigm generally favors the centralization
of ownership and control at large. This is why Uber and Lyft are such
anomalies and why they bend conventional categories so. In a traditional
firm, ownership and control is centralized in two senses, not one: in the
sense of ownership of the relevant assets (e.g., the intellectual property in
team logos in American Needle or the vehicles in the case of ride services)
and in the sense of financial capital, which is associated with a centralized
management structure.24 Uber and Lyft decentralize ownership of the assets
on which operations actually rely, while retaining the reliance on central-
ized ownership and control of financial capital (and ensuring centralized
control within the firm itself) associated with conventional business firms.
This is likely why it is difficult to “see” even the surface doctrinal antitrust
problem raised by these firms, the more so one is enculturated not only in
the current antitrust paradigm but also in existing business culture. Those
who have difficulty seeing this problem aren’t exactly wrong; they are em-
bodying a feature of the deep structure of antitrust’s firm exemption.
In other words, at its root, antitrust’s firm exemption has a tendency to
assume the organization of a conventional business firm, including attrib-
utes of centralized control within the firm. This is evidenced in many of the
casual references made in the cases explicating the single entity doctrine
21. Klein, supra note 18, at 669.
22. See Paul, supra note 7; Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and the Labor Market,
supra note 7; Steinbaum, Uber’s Antitrust Problem, supra note 7.
23. See Paul II, supra note 3, at Part II.B (discussing the vertical restraints doctrine and other
routes by which Uber might seek to justify its price coordination activity).
24. Despite the existence of individual shareholders, control over voting shares is typically
much more concentrated.
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itself, which often assume and reference a traditional business firm. By con-
trast, federal courts do not typically refer to the internal structure of worker-
owned and controlled cooperative firms when explicating antitrust’s firm
exemption. Therefore, antitrust is not agnostic about what goes on inside
the firm, and it largely assumes the firm’s conventional organization, which
is typically orchestrated by institutions ultimately representing financial
capital. This is not entirely surprising when one considers that hostility to
worker agency or democracy within firms runs deep among theorists who
have been highly influential upon the current antitrust paradigm.25 This fur-
nishes both the deeper explanation for the risk of antitrust liability a hypo-
thetical drivers’ association would face, and the reason why Uber and
similar firms’ apparent immunity from the same risk is cold comfort to
drivers considering such a strategy.
THE FIRM EXEMPTION AND ACCESS TO FINANCE
Drivers pursuing the incorporation solution face antitrust uncertainties
on less favorable terms than Uber and Lyft, immediately putting them at a
competitive disadvantage. They also face differential obstacles in accessing
finance, which in turn puts them at a disadvantage in terms of both normal
business competition and the resolution of legal uncertainties, notably the
risk of antitrust liability. The comparative difficulty drivers would face in
obtaining access to equity stakes or loans in fact highlights that the firm
exemption goes beyond antitrust law and suffuses our legal system.
Our financial system as it exists prioritizes the ability to end legal rela-
tionships quickly, whether in the form of the ability to sell legal title to
physical assets, or in order to dispose of creditor relationships. This is com-
monly referred to as “liquidity.”26 The need for liquidity comes from the
fact that financiers must be able to meet large financial commitments on
short notice and change the mix of assets they own based on new informa-
tion. As a result, the most valuable assets are those that can be sold, or
borrowed against, on short notice and at or near their accounted-for mone-
tary value. Equivalently, the debtors in the most socially advantageous posi-
tion are those who can offer liquid, safe assets to their creditors. If those in
need of finance can’t offer liquidity and safety, they must find “patient in-
25. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Organization of Work: A Comparative Institutional
Assessment, 1 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 5 (1980) (Williamson’s ideas have made a lasting mark upon
antitrust law through the influence of Robert Bork and others, as argued in Paul I, supra note 2).
See also Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON.
REV. 105, 114–15 (1969); Spencer Thompson, Towards a Social Theory of the Firm: Worker
Cooperatives Reconsidered, 3 J. COOP. ORG. & MGMT. 3, 6–8 (2015) (pointing out that the disfa-
vor toward firms organized in other ways, for example through worker ownership, was not limited
to firms involving “one-worker/one-vote” styles of management, but even to “the bundling of
work and wealth” itself, thus extending to worker-owned firms in general).
26. Bruce G. Carruthers & Arthur L. Stinchcombe, The Social Structure of Liquidity: Flexi-
bility, Markets, and States, 28 THEORY & SOC. 353, 353–54 (1999).
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vestors” and be capable of offering a lot of “upside” uncertainty. This struc-
ture for provisioning finance—which is ultimately the product of contingent
legal and social choices—reinforces the firm exemption in a number of
ways.
First, because financiers will only lend to legal entities vested with
relevant control rights, loose associations are deprived of financing. Incor-
poration itself does not change this. Even if they incorporated, loose as-
sociations cannot pledge property or control rights that they themselves do
not have.27 Individuals and smaller firms can leave loose associations and
are under no legal obligation to hand over physical assets to would-be cred-
itors of loose associations.
Second, even democratic firms, vested with control rights, are limited
in their access to finance. Though they may be able to access some credit on
that basis, they cannot offer conditional control rights to financiers through
debt covenants—which are typical and will likely be required by most lend-
ers unless the democratic firm is somehow already dominant and wealthy.28
To be more precise, democratic firms cannot do this without sacrificing at
least a portion of their democratic character, which requires retaining con-
trol rights and dispersing them among producers in some meaningful way.
Similarly, they cannot, by definition, offer equity stakes to investors who
are not workers or other participants in the firm without sacrificing their
character. In other words, our current financial system predates actual or
potential democratic characteristics of firms even in those limited circum-
stances in which democratic firms can access finance to some extent.
Third, company IOUs and equity stakes become fairly safe and liquid
when the company in question dominates markets and is very wealthy. The
lax and solicitous attitude of today’s antitrust law to dominant firms thus
compounds the advantageous access to finance that successful firms already
have.29 Relatedly, equity stakes can become fairly safe and liquid even
when a company is unprofitable, as long as there is a conventional belief
that it will become profitable in the future. This is the advantageous situa-
tion in which Uber finds itself today.30 And hope is not lost even in the
circumstance there isn’t a conventional belief that a company will become
profitable in the future; some financiers may be willing to provide equity
27. For a historical example of such associations, consider the formal cartels and “pools”
(often incorporated) that American industry tried as a coordination strategy prior to the innovation
of the formal business trust by the Standard Oil Company. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIAL-
IZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 181–92 (1997).
28. David J. Denis & Jing Wang, Debt Covenant Renegotiations and Creditor Control
Rights, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 348, 349 (2014).
29. Hyman P. Minsky, The Evolution of Financial Institutions and the Performance of the
Economy, 20 J. ECON. ISSUES 345, 348–49 (1986).
30. Michael J. de la Merced & Kate Conger, Uber I.P.O. Values Ride-Hailing Giant at $82.4
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/technology/uber-ipo-
stock-price.html.
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investment for long periods of time to unprofitable companies because the
payoff will be extremely large if those companies were to succeed. This
payoff will be based in part upon the selectively favorable coordination
rights allocated by antitrust law to this hypothetically successful, hierarchi-
cal, top-down firm. In other words, the knowledge that the competitive
threat from driver associations is limited by antitrust law, and that the op-
portunity for a young venture capital-driven firm to dominate markets is
relatively unconstrained by law, creates more incentives to invest, and thus
reinforces such firms’ favorable access to finance.
The financial press is filled with stories about venture capitalist invest-
ments in Google, Apple, and similar entities.31 The appetite of this category
of financiers provides an enormous financial advantage for young, hierar-
chical firms looking to grow quickly and dominate markets. What all this
amounts to is that our current financial system allocates finance to those
that currently possess wealth and market dominance, while allocating addi-
tional funds to those firms that financiers are willing to gamble will become
wealthy and dominate markets in the future.32 This gamble is profitable
because it forecloses the possibility that young firms will have any demo-
cratic character. Thus, it is the hierarchical access to finance which trans-
forms the hierarchical organization of production from a quirk of our legal
system into the organizing principle of our social system.
This hierarchy of finance is worsened in our era of lax antitrust en-
forcement policy. The potential value of equity in young firms becomes
almost unbounded when the “realistic” possibility emerges that these firms
can gain a “monopolistic” market share. The strong expectation that a sus-
tained unprofitable firm like Uber would be charged with predatory pricing
or attempting to monopolize a market would greatly limit their access to
finance, regardless of potential antitrust liability from price fixing. But that
is not the current state of antitrust law. In this sense, one way to conceive of
strong enforcement of traditional antitrust rules is that they cap the financ-
ing benefits derived from the firm exemption.
Instead, companies like Uber actually benefit from legal uncertainty
because their early investment in, and ability to afford, substantial amounts
of professional legal services (and political relationships) cultivates the ex-
pectation that legal uncertainties will likely be resolved in their favor. Busi-
ness corporations also have the benefit of limited liability, which means
equity valuations don’t reflect the full value of potential loss from legal
uncertainties being resolved against businesses like Uber. Democratic firms
31. Arleen Jacobius, Facebook IPO Could Be Tipping Point for Venture Capitalists: Some
Venture Capitalists Reflecting on the Good Old Google Days, 40 PENSIONS & INV. 2 (2012).
32. This point interestingly converges to the argument in Minsky, supra note 29. The differ-
ence is that Minsky missed antitrust’s allocation of coordination rights and seemed to think price
setting could be “returned” to “the market” after vigorous enough antitrust enforcement against
large firms.
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also benefit from limited liability, but they are unable to benefit as much
from it in terms of access to finance since they can’t issue equity liabilities
to outside investors.
Uber’s large valuation thus, in large part, reflects the possible returns
from a legally victorious Uber. Consequently, its equity issuance helps fund
the very outcome “priced in” to their company’s valuations. This is why, to
address the legal problem posed by American Needle, Uber could hypothet-
ically afford reorganization to attempt to prove it is a “centralized firm” by
buying the right to use Uber drivers’ personal vehicles for commercial use
and defend this legally untested form in court, something that’s not feasible
for a “bottom-up” driver association for all the reasons that have been set
out.
Innovation, whether it be technological or legal, inherently requires
resources now, with uncertain payoffs far into the future. A somewhat dif-
ferently structured financial system might forgo the need for collateral and
instead lend on an unsecured basis, intending to hold loans to maturity.
Without the need to sell assets to meet financial commitments, such a finan-
cial system could focus on long-term relationship lending and allocate less
credit to already dominant, hierarchical top-down firms. This change would
simply be a matter of legal design. Bank charters already franchise out to
private entities the public power to create money; regulations over the types
of lending banks do could replace attempts to regulate banks by rationing
liquidity.33 Even in this scenario, insofar as banks would have to consider
default uncertainty and direct financial returns, finance would still reinforce
the firm exemption.34 It would not do so as sharply and as brutally as it
33. See generally Robert Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1143, 1155–201 (2017); Rohan Grey, Banking in a Digital Fiat Currency Regime,
in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 169 (Philipp Hacker et
al. eds., 2019).
34. This isn’t to suggest that this is any less socially or legally contingent than any of the
other processes we have discussed. For example, most “patient investment” ultimately comes
from money “pools” that, by this point, are largely made up of individuals investing for retirement
or pension funds. Minsky, supra note 29, referred to this as “Money Manager Capitalism.” Under
a different legal regime, these funds could instead provide grants to democratic firms and for
purchasing and democratizing existing firms. The remaining money “pools,” which are under the
direct control of the wealthy, are themselves the result of legal changes, such as the removal of
estate taxes, which allow such wealth to accumulate. Zoltan Pozsar astutely points out that “asset-
liability mismatches,” and the resulting financial innovations to accommodate them, could be
relieved by shrinking these institutional cash pools directly. The differential access to finance is
simply another aspect of this phenomenon. See L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Money Manager Capi-
talism and the Global Financial Crisis, 40 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 5, 16 (2011); Michael A. McCar-
thy, Turning Labor into Capital: Pension Funds and the Corporate Control of Finance, 42 POL. &
SOC. 455 (2014); Zoltan Pozsar, A Macro View of Shadow Banking: Levered Betas and Whole-
sale Funding in the Context of Secular Stagnation 25–28 (Jan. 31, 2015) (unpublished manu-
script), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2558945 (follow “Download This
Paper”).
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does now, but it would still do so. This points to how deeply ingrained the
firm exemption is in the prevailing legal order.35
Corporate law could also be reformed to limit the reach of the firm
exemption. Currently unprofitable companies seeking outside equity invest-
ment could be required to register with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. If their business model is deemed to be based in socially
undesirable forms of legal innovation, rather than genuine socially benefi-
cial technological innovation, they could simply be barred from issuing eq-
uity liabilities.36 Companies could also be limited in the kind of equity and
debt obligations they could issue to nonbank financiers. New corporate
forms could also be introduced for democratic microenterprises and to con-
solidate access to finance for federations of democratic microenterprises. In
this way, along with an unsecured lending-based, triple-bottom-line bank-
ing system,37 access to finance could become less hierarchical,38 and the
excesses of the firm exemption would be curbed. In the absence of such
meaningful reforms, however, drivers and other producers and service prov-
iders are effectively closed off from competing with the hierarchy of fi-
nance engendered by the firm exemption.
CONCLUSION
We show that a drivers’ cooperative would have difficulty demonstrat-
ing the integration necessary to qualify for antitrust’s firm exemption under
existing law. Moreover, putting the burden on such an association to test
this gray area has the effect of rendering this gray area far less likely to be
fairly tested. Drivers do not have the financial resources to fund a lengthy
and costly defense, in contrast to dominant firms, which have relied on
venture capital and now the financial markets to invest in molding the law
to their desired business models. This is not only an issue of differential
starting wealth endowments, however: our existing system for provisioning
credit itself reinforces, at multiple levels, antitrust’s criteria for allocating
economic coordination rights.
35. It is beyond the scope of this paper to articulate what a financial system that didn’t
reinforce the firm exemption might look like, but see infra note 37.
36. This could function similarly to Professor Omarova’s “FDA for financial products.”
Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 87–88 (2012).
37. Grey, supra note 33, at 172; Olaf Weber, Social Banking: Concept, Definitions and Prac-
tice, 14 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 265, 265 (2014).
38. It is also important to note that public grant funding of innovation—which already hap-
pens through public universities and administrative agencies—could be allocated to loose associa-
tions and individuals as a replacement to inherently hierarchical equity liability funding. This
could fully excise our legal system’s preference against democratic cooperation. See also Rohan
Grey, Who Owns the Intellectual Fruits of Job Guarantee Labor?, in THE JOB GUARANTEE AND
MODERN MONEY: REALIZING KEYNES’S LABOR STANDARD 207, 212–17 (Mathew Forstater et al.
eds., 2017).
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In addition, barring bargaining agency through a drivers’ association
renders it far less likely that working people will practically be in a position
to work their way up to greater levels of integration.39 In other words, per-
mitting a looser drivers’ association in which ownership and revenues are
dispersed makes it far more likely that a more integrated enterprise will
eventually emerge (assuming arguendo that the latter is a better policy out-
come here). When that does happen, a successful firm accountable to the
people who provide the services it sells, rather than primarily to disinter-
ested investors, is more likely to reinvest in itself and its communities,
rather than prioritizing dividends and distributions to shareholders.
In short, “let them incorporate” is a poor solution to the Uber antitrust
problem. Instead, it highlights the deep level at which antitrust’s existing
criteria for allocating coordination rights operate, and it highlights anti-
trust’s symbiotic relationship with our existing system for provisioning fi-
nance. Thus, the hypothetical possibility of an incorporated drivers’
association heightens, rather than obviates, the reasons to reexamine anti-
trust law’s allocation of coordination rights, which is biased in favor of
concentrations of ownership and control, and against workers and demo-
cratic cooperation.
39. See, e.g., Vaheesan & Schneider, supra note 1 (discussing this point and some of the
literature supporting it).
